

New International Anti-Terror Battlefield: In Response to Daesh Media Challenge

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Abstract: *The rise of Daesh (ISIS) brings terrorism to a new era, compared with its military combat capability, funds-raising ability and inhuman terrorist acts, its deliberate and superb media propaganda strategy and offense are also astonishing. Daesh tries to use media propaganda to achieve multiple strategic objectives: building a strong brand for attraction, roping in the extreme elements or organizations to balance counterparts, and creating a terrorist psychological deterrent to peoples and the governments of all countries. For this, the international community has been on the alert, but the prevention and combat are far from enough. International media cooperation is weak, lack of relevant media ethics standards and rules, and media strategy of counter terrorism short of investment and other resources, which have seriously hampered development of the media war on terror. To achieve victory on both "online" and "offline" will be the only outlet to win the final victory of the international war on terror.*

On June 29, 2014, led by al-Baghdadi, the Daesh (ISIS) announced its official establishment in Iraq. After just a year and a half, its rapid rise has dealt a huge blow to the already seriously "fragmented" Mid-East situation. At the beginning of 2015, Richard Haas, chairman of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations forecast that although the Mid-East faces many security challenges, yet none of them like Daesh that is so huge, dangerous and urgent.¹ Even more frightening is that Daesh is not only expanding military occupation in Syria and Iraq, but also frequently launching terrorist attacks in countries and regions outside the Mid-East. On November 13, 2015, a number of facilities including the French stadium in Paris, France, were attacked by terrorists, Daesh subsequently announced its responsibility. And just in October and November, Daesh launched terrorist attacks on Ankara, Senna Peninsula, Beirut, Paris, Bamako and Tunisia and other cities, resulting in 530 casualties.² By early 2015, about 20000 people from all over the world go to Syria to join Daesh,

far more than the number of foreign citizens joining other jihad extremist groups combined.³

The growth of the Daesh organization earmarks the entry of global terrorism into "3.0 era". Countries around the world begin reflecting on the limitations of military counter terrorism, and try to further explore its growth root causes. International counterterrorism expert William McCants argues that the reason that Daesh is able to conquer such a vast territory and has a steady stream of supporters is because it is more cruel, more keen to promote the "Doomsday" and more pious to serve the goal to establish Khalifa.⁴ In 2014, U.S. national security expert Peter Bergen also believes that the Daesh media campaign subverts our traditional understanding of terrorist organizations. He also writes in "Jihad Terrorism: A New Threat Assessment" that ISIS is quite skilled in using social media and other media, this is a hitherto unknown phenomenon. Countries around the world begin reexamining the new character of current international terrorism. U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Secretary James Johnson said on May 10, 2015 in a speech that the unprecedented success of the IS media strategy marks the global terrorist threat has entered a 'brand new stage'.⁵

However, there is not much research at home and abroad on impact of terrorist media propaganda and response measures. But those published research papers domestically and internationally in this regard provide some clues for conception of this paper. This paper will start with background of the profound evolving relationship between the media and terrorism, streamline the development process of Daesh media strategy from birth to maturity, reveal the necessity of international cooperation in this new media battlefield, explore various publicity constraints in this regard, and search for a new approach to this complex security threat.

I. The evolving relationship between media and terrorism

Scholar Magnet Thatcher once pointed out that the media is the oxygen for survival of terrorism.⁶ In recent years, the rapid rise of new media technology represented by social media as well as importance attached to the media by the terrorist organizations have triggered the evolving relationship between media and terrorism, so that the current international terrorism has shown new ecological characteristics.

First, the media role in development strategy of terrorist organizations is that their transformation from "weapon" to "battlefield" is realized. In all kinds of modern terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda expressed the importance of media earlier. As early as before the "9 / 11" attacks, Bin Laden had pointed out that the popularization of media publicity and satellite TV technology can be matched with the power of the UAV and the atomic bomb.⁷ In December 2001, A. al-Zawahri in the book *Knights under the Prophets Banner* writes that any Jihad Movement can only be successful in Arab people's bottom of hearts opening up the Islamic base.⁸ In 2002, Bin Laden in a letter written to Taliban leader Omar says that the media war has become the most effective struggle, which effectiveness has occupied 90% of all forms of struggles.⁹ In the second half of 2007, the U.S. troops in Iraq raided a number of media base of Al-Qaeda, and found all modern electronic equipments. David Petraeus in

command of the raid predicted that the war with Al-Qaeda will not be confined to the battleground in Iraq, and will also be in the cyber network and the media spontaneously.¹⁰

In recent years, whether between major terrorist organizations, or between terrorist organizations and the countries of international anti-terrorism coalition, the struggle for greater publicity influence has intensified. In addition to military operational capacity and funds -raising ability, the media has also become a new field of competition for terrorist organizations, which has been confirmed from Daesh quickly catching up with Al-Qaeda. At the beginning of the establishment, Al-Qaeda Central tried to use the pan-Arabia radio station, but to ensure safety the broadcasting is cut down. Al-Qaeda branches in Mid-East and Africa are short of capacity to run media.¹¹ Before the rise of Daesh, AQAP--branch of Al-Qaeda in Arab Peninsula -- was good at media usage, and tried to use "Inspire" magazine to promote Samir Khan's impact, to encourage members to adopt a lone wolf action in the West, but its propaganda activities suffered a serious setback under the encirclement by the Yemen army.¹² At present, most branches of Al-Qaeda have retained the propaganda model since 2001, such as the long video in the jihad ideology, and quoted the holy book in a boring way.

Comparatively speaking, Daesh media tactics are obviously much more flexible and effective, and its media campaigns show different emphases for different domains.

In international propaganda, Daesh highlights its ideal for subversion of the existing international order and rule the world with Islamic teaching. While in the controlled areas in Syria and Iraq, it tries to shape itself into a social movement or a state to protect the weak, and represent interests of the Sunni community, and focus on "Sunni nationalism".¹³ Daesh also demonizes counterparts to upgrade its image. In the short film-WAR, the producer carefully interspersed with exciting background music, dramatic explosion scene, Presidents Obama and George W. Bush are vilified. This is a film close to an action movie in Hollywood.¹⁴ Obviously, Daesh in a short period grows stronger more rapidly than Al-Qaeda, which is directly related to its more sophisticated media propaganda strategy.

At present, the major news media websites (general news websites and jihad websites), exclusive journals (such as "Inspire"--the English language magazine of Al-Qaeda.) and social media (Twitter and FaceBook) and other public communication platforms have become the focus of terrorist organizations to contend. Meanwhile, more and more terrorist organizations have come to realize that the successful media propaganda compared with the terrorist attack itself can produce greater shocks, but also quickly upset various countries anti-terrorism program.¹⁵ Just as Neville Boulter, an American scholar, said that ISIS has created a new interactive propaganda model, and can effectively affect the policy decisions by anti-terror countries.¹⁶ Therefore, how to effectively control all kinds of media platforms, to produce more effective video, presentation of speeches, recordings and images than the counterparts have become the focus of terrorist organizations and the global anti-terrorism union.

Second, the major terrorist organizations began becoming organizers and producers from being media audience only. In the 1970s–90s, all governments had a strong control over media, terrorist organizations were in the "back door" position to get various media resources. However, with the skillful use of media by terrorist forces, costs are falling, they start occupying the media "front door" position. In 2012, Rauf Arif visited 20 media staff working in Pakistan and found that, compared with the U.S. media staff, Taliban members can have more convenient and accurate access to a variety of media resources.¹⁷ Capacity of terrorist organizations using well-known websites, or even establishing jihad exclusive websites is on rapid increase. In 2000, there were only 20 Jihadist websites, which increased to 4800 only five years later.¹⁸

Compared with the past reliance on the mainstream media reports after launching a terrorist attack first, the independent use of media by the current international terrorist organizations increase significantly. As-Sahab as Al-Qaeda main propaganda studio produced and showed 16 videos in 2005, 58 in 2006, and over 90 in 2007. In 2006, the Global Islamic Media Front—Al-Qaeda's another media agency – held Jihad seminars, released a large amount of technical information about the attack on the U.S. military.¹⁹ Daesh also establishes and uses a

variety of media agencies, such as its official media platform -- the Al-Furqan Institute for Public Relations Production and al-Athzam Agency for Media Production, etc. – to frequently produce all kinds of video, image, text, audio and other promotional materials; and also sets up al-Hayat Media Center and other websites specialized for producing promotional materials for Western and non-Arabic audiences.²⁰ Obviously, major terrorist organizations have made rapid progress in the production of media promotional products and the use of media platforms.

Finally, the media propaganda has become the main force to promote transformation of the behavior mode of terrorist organizations. Pushed by the brand new propaganda model, the ways of terrorist organizations for recruitment, attack and struggle begin changing. It is not difficult to find after a review of the action mode of Al-Qaeda that it is far from achieving the synchronous operation between the media propaganda and the specific actions. Bin Laden, for example, had to wait for several weeks before broadcasting its promotional materials by choosing international non-mainstream media; collective communication on the Internet could only use more closed chat rooms. Hence, there is a rather long cycle period between its propaganda and terrorist attacks.

In recent years, the newly emerged terrorist forces with Daesh as the representative begin realizing the "zero time difference" between propaganda and terrorist attacks, and also focus on a high level coincidence between propaganda and the strategic objectives of various periods. From August to mid-September 2014, Daesh main objective was to condemn and resist the interventions by the United States and other Western countries. During this period, Daesh killed a number of hostages from western countries and condemned their military interventions. It produced a video with the title "ISIS Message to the United States of America" and emphasized that all guilt should be taken by the United States and Canada.²¹ And after mid-September, its goal was changed to launch direct attacks on those Western countries. Abu M. al-Adnani, Daesh head, in his speech "You really need to be on your guard", called on its members to kill "suspects" of the Western countries.²² Then, Australia, Canada and the United States

and other countries were indeed met with Daesh number of terrorist attacks.²³ And obviously, the media publicity is no longer independent of the preaching of the terrorist acts, a compact convergence between "Online" propaganda and "Offline" acts has become a new operation mode of terrorist organizations.

II. The Daesh evolving media promotion strategy

The Daesh media campaigns can find important clues and origin in the operation of its predecessor organizations. Before June 2014, the Daesh predecessor -- Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) -- already begun discussing and promoting the media propaganda campaign. This process is mainly divided into two stages. The first stage is from 2006 to 2012, focusing on Iraqi media campaigns. In October 2006, Al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq established the ISI. The organization since its establishment vigorously promotes extremist ideology, such as Iraq must destroy the minority ethnics and other sectarians (especially the Yazidis and Christians), and the Shiite is a huge threat, and advocate global military conquest and all kinds of brutal behaviors, etc. These ideas become the main content of the later ISIS propaganda, especially the ISI ideal to "try to build a Khalifa state", which can viewed as the pre-play for ISIS promoted goal to establish a state.²⁴ The second stage is from 2012 to 2014, ISI had extended the propaganda campaign from Iraq to Syria, in attempt to make "culture and emotion" mobilization to the Muslim world.²⁵ In early 2012, ISI released its first important media product, "The Expedition of the Prisoners: Part 1", showing how the U.S. and the Iraqi military abused prisoners of war in a Iraq prison, highlighting the suffering of Sunnis.²⁶ In June 2012, a program by Al-Furqan Media claimed that the Shiite pilgrims have moved to Karbala and Najaf from Mecca, and the whole Mid-East is captured,²⁷ showing off victory of its military action. With deterioration of the civil war in Syria, ISI continuously increases publicity efforts. In January 2013, ISI in "Seven Facts" video claims that the struggle in Iraq and Syria is a part of the great global jihad war. From April 2013 to February 2014, ISIS was expelled by Al-Qaeda, then ISIS for the first time released a pure original video program, the "Window on the Epic Battlefield".²⁸ In January 2014, ISIS members on

Twitter announced a media organization named Al-Battar, and attract more than 3000 people to join within six months.²⁹ At this point, ISIS's propaganda mode has a series of new ideas, such as pursuing high level production standards, emphasizing the use of social media and attracting the pan-Islamic and non-Arabic national audience, etc. This propaganda mode can be viewed as a prototype of the current ISIS media strategy

Since its establishment, the development and implementation of ISIS media promotion strategy are mainly in the following aspects:

First, arousing the emotional resonance of Muslim people, creating a brand new image in order to obtain the manpower and material resources support

In order to attract more and more new members to join, ISIS has built, shaped and maintained its huge brand appeal. In such a strong attraction, religion has gradually become a license to join ISIS, but no longer the necessary condition, political, moral and life values can be excuses for ISIS to encourage new members to join.³⁰ ISIS mainly through the following ways carries out political marketing and brand shaping. One, trying to create a strong emotional resonance in the bottom of Muslims hearts around the world, by constantly integrating the Muslims experience of suffering into its propaganda contents to wake up their conscience of grief³¹ and cooking the persecution of Muslims by the United States and other western countries in order to improve its appeal. On December 9, 2014, ISIS released CIA Torture Report, describing the prisons abusive process by the CIA staff.³²

The purpose of the released report is to show that ISIS can also treat hostages in the way the Muslim prisoners treated by the United States at Guantanamo prison, but claimed that their staff is much more kind than the CIA staff; and repeatedly stressed those abused are all Muslims in order to stimulate the Muslims in retaliation against the U.S. officials. "The Torture of Muslims by Crusades" has become the core slogan for ISIS to attract new members.³³ Two, adopting fashionable narrative. ISIS promotes not only its ideology and political stance in social media, but also dopes with a lot of fashionable rebel culture.³⁴ Therefore, for European, American, Canadian and Australian young people,

etc. regardless of social strata they come from, education background they have, or a religion they believe, who are very easy to accept ISIS narrative way. Survey data shows that ISIS does 845 publicity activities from January 2014 to September 16, 2015, 15% content of which is enlightened by the modern popular culture embodied in movies, electronic games and music videos, etc.³⁵ - and use full modern image to attract young people in the world. Three, demonstrating a superb level of production. Different with the long-boring video produced by Al-Qaeda, ISIS employ technical staff familiar with audience's national culture and psychological characteristics to produce a large number of infectious material. To produce the latest video "The Clanging of Swords: IV", ISIS even uses HD video camera carried by UMV to shoot aerial view of Anbar controlled by ISIS,³⁶ showing the superb level of a action movie.

At present, Twitter, FaceBook and Youtube and other well-known platforms have become the main carriers for ISIS recruitment of members. In March 2015, supported by the "Relations between the United States and the Islamic World" project run by the Brookings Institution, Berger and Morgan made some in-depth investigation into ISIS in using Twitter from September to December 2014. The report shows that its supporters opened 46000 accounts on Twitter, and an average Twitter account attracts about 1000 net-fans. Those highly active users between 500 and 2000 show alarming ability to spread.³⁷ These social media mainly through three aspects help ISIS quickly and effectively spread its "Apocalyptic" and build "Khalifa" state and other slogans: One is to create a high sense of urgency, i.e., the world doomsday is arriving. Two is to strengthen social penetration, i.e., through the continuous expansion of interpersonal interaction to maximize the possible support. Three is to create a deep sense of immersion, i.e., may people get immersed in good fantasy of the future "Khalifa".³⁸ Compared to the long publicity cycle of other religious or terrorist groups, it took only a few months for ISIS to successfully in the world spread these major ideas. Obviously, ISIS media staff recruitment work is extremely smooth. According to the UN statistics at the beginning of 2015, of the ISIS's 25000 foreign fighters in the country, 71% of whom are the people mainly from Arab and Muslim world as

well as the Western countries,³⁹ foreign members see substantial increase. By March 2015, there were approximately 5000 - 6000 Europeans having joined the ISIS.⁴⁰ While the U.S. young people and young people of other countries are ISIS main targeted groups. For example, in the first half of 2015, a 17 year-old high school student from the state of Virginia tried to bring friends to join ISIS. In the previous month, a 16 year-old high school student with three youngsters from Denver were also found travelling to Turkey and Syria to join ISIS, who were fortunately prevented.⁴¹ It is not difficult to find that young people occupy a large proportion of ISIS new members, which is completely different with that of Al-Qaeda.⁴²

Second, contending for the terrorist resources, and trying to balance Al-Qaeda and other counterparts

In order to win the victory of heart and mind, through making public media statements or giving TV or publications interviews, Al-Qaeda and ISIS have close interactions with terrorist suspects or other branches. ISIS obviously has gained the upper hand in this game play.

Firstly, ISIS draws in terrorists or suspects through frequent media interactions. In order to get more reserve forces all over the world, ISIS and Al-Qaeda compete in claiming responsibility for various terrorist attacks, and claimed through media that the attack was launched by its members, and even praised the attackers' behavior. One notorious case is their reactions after two terrorist attacks in Paris on January 7, 2015. In an interview with French television, Sheriff Kuvac, one of the principal shooters in weekly "Charlie" claimed that he had been funded by AQAP loyal to Al-Qaeda.⁴³ On January 14, head of the AQAP N. bin Anshi claimed responsible for the matter in a video.⁴⁴ It is quite dramatic that terrorist A. Kulibali at almost the same time during January 7-9, 2015 attacked a grocery store in eastern Paris. On January 11 two days after he was killed, his loyal announcement to ISIS video was on the Internet and he also admitted to have cooperation with Kuvac brothers who attacked weekly "Charlie".⁴⁵ Then, ISIS immediately published his wife Hayat Bohm - Dean interview in its French magazine -- The Islamic World. Allegedly, she has left France for ISIS territory in Syria.⁴⁶ ISIS then

announced its responsibility for the Paris grocery store attacks.

In addition to actively claiming responsibility for various terrorist attacks, ISIS also sings praise of these horror "acts" through its magazines. Its English magazine "Dabiq" reports on the Barry Cooley attacks and describes it as "brave jihad". In an interview, Hayat also mentioned that her husband did not allow her to take a look at ISIS's video, and was afraid she would leave France for Syria, and could not complete the task in France.⁴⁷ The response of Al-Qaeda and ISIS after the two terrorist attacks fully confirmed the fierce competition between ISIS and Al-Qaeda for members.

Secondly, ISIS through the media interactions also takes over other branches. In the face of other branches extending olive-branches, ISIS most readily accepts and praises. For example, on the November 10, 2014 at public video, Nigerian Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau extended greetings to the ISIS new Khalifa, but did not mention Al-Qaeda and Zawahri.⁴⁸ BH had announced its loyalty to Al-Qaeda, but now on the side of ISIS.⁴⁹ On March 7, 2015, Shekau officially announced on Twitter its allegiance to al-Baghdadi that despite ups and downs he will definitely obey the command of the ISIS.⁵⁰ Subsequently, ISIS immediately welcomes BH to join through media. On 12 March, ISIS's spokesman Mohamed al-Adnani played a recorder saying that our new country expands to West Africa, Allah will bless us.....We accept allegiance from BH brothers".⁵¹ Previously, ISIS also played other video through which supporters welcome Abubakar Shekau. It can be concluded that BH joined ISIS, which is resulted from long-term effective communication by the latter.⁵²

Al-Qaeda is very hostile to this. On February 9, 2015, Al-Qaeda supporter Ansalu in a video on Youtube attacked BH, calling its acts "contrary to Islam".⁵³ Intense competition between Al-Qaeda and ISIS in the field of media communication shows that they want to gain more than the Jihadist Movement's leadership, but to conquer the global Jihadists soul.⁵⁴

Third, promoting the brutal acts and psychological deterrent to governments and peoples of various countries

Although ISIS has a strong ability to "mislead the enemy" in a military action,⁵⁵ it is

not satisfied with a purely military victory, the media propaganda has become a powerful weapon for it to create a huge panic effect. Compared with other terrorist organizations, ISIS encourages its members to record various atrocities with a crazy passion. At a Congressional hearing in June 2015, FBI James - Komi in report on how ISIS uses Twitter pointed out that ISIS calls on those supporters who cannot personally go to Syria or Iraq to "go to Khalifa to pioneer a glorious life If you can't come here, then kill some people in your country, such as uniformed soldiers If you are able to chop off their heads, be sure to record it, record it." ⁵⁶

Whipped up by these propaganda and agitation, the number of bloody killing in video by ISIS is on the rise. In August 2014, ISIS in YouTube and other websites uploaded the killing of an American journalist James Frey and other Americans and British. In addition, the Jordan pilot was burned alive and some Syrians, Kurds and Christians were being slaughtered, which was recorded in a video, also uploaded on Twitter and FaceBook. Another recorded scene is that more than 100 captives just wearing underwear were told to face down after lying on the ground, then were being shot immediately by extremists. In this regard, President Obama called it "the act of extreme evil".⁵⁷

What is more is that ISIS also added a lot of intimidation in the video speech, further increased psychological deterrent effect. For example, on June 26, 2015, a resort in Tunisia suffered terrorist attacks with 38 visitors killed. Subsequently, ISIS immediately announced on Twitter that "with Allah permission, they will bring more harm to other people." In a killing American video, ISIS spoke directly to U.S. President: "We are back, Obama ... You have a very wrong diplomatic policy on ISIS, ... When the missiles invade our land, our blades will continue to pierce your head."⁵⁸ Facts prove that as a result of a similar psychological deterrent, peoples and governments of all countries feel more and more scared of ISIS. In 2014, the U.S. Wall Street Journal and NBC made a public opinion poll indicating that 94% of respondents believed that the United States is more dangerous than the 9/11 attacks.⁵⁹ Similarly, in a shadow of this panic, the U.S. Democratic Party and Republican Party support

rate on air strikes against ISIS rose to 65% and 67% respectively in September 2014.⁶⁰ All in all, through media interactions, ISIS has succeeded in upgrading the audience's "watching" experience onto a sense of participation and a sense of the "witness" experience.⁶¹

Fourth, inciting and supporting especially young people to launch the "lone wolf" attacks

It is alarming that more and more teenagers under the ISIS propaganda begin frequently launching in home country the "lone wolf" actions. Compared with traditional terrorists, their actions are more flexible and subtle and their number is also more difficult to determine. Take the United States for example, as of June 2015, among 3400 people having gone to Syria and Iraq from Western countries, the Americans are 200, but the number of the ISIS inside the United States is difficult to judge. In this regard, Michel Stenbuck, deputy director for the FBI Anti-terrorism Department said in his report to the House Homeland Security Committee that ISIS is advancing to the United States with unprecedented intensity,⁶² and in order to induce brave young man to take the "lone wolf" action, ISIS promises to provide the necessary supplies and techniques in mass media.⁶³ ISIS also beautifies those taking the "lone wolf" actions and releases their personal views on Twitter.

Under the influence of this propaganda, some ISIS supporters have become the "lone wolf" actors. In France on October 20, 2014, a Frenchman believing in Islam broke into a police station and shouted "Great Allah" and then shot down 3 persons. In Denmark on February 14, 2014 a citizen attacked a cultural center. In Canada on October 22, 2014, a Canadian who believes in Sunnism attacked the Monument to Heroes and the Parliament. In the United States on December 20, 2014, a Muslim from Brooklyn shot two police officers. In Australia on September 23, 2014, a 18-year old youth stabbed two police officers. Three days earlier, ISIS spokesman clamored in a cyber network video that If there is a chance to kill Americans, Europeans, French, etc., and then do it, and as long as you believe and rely on Allah, you will succeed. In this regard, an Australian Prof. Wesley argues that there is no coincidence between this kind of instruction issued by ISIS and the immediate murderous attacks.⁶⁴ Hence,

the "lone wolf" terrorist attacks are likely to continue to spread.

In summary, ISIS media propaganda strategy has achieved multiple results: ISIS positions itself the main enemy of Western countries and successfully balances Al-Qaeda; shapes itself into the frontrunner for Global Jihad Movement; wins over support of considerable part of the Muslim public and other Jihadist groups in the world.⁶⁵ Like other new generation of terrorist groups, ISIS thus begins highlighting its new strategic focus, i.e., attracting government and public concerns all over the world but not only with violence itself.⁶⁶ In December 2015, ISIS in east of Afghanistan set up "Radio Khalifa" encouraging Afghan people to launch war on the "cheating government" in Pashto language,⁶⁷ which shows the media strength unabated. ISIS also extends its media tentacles into other areas of conflict. In October 2015, ISIS made a video titled "Returning terror to the Jews" commending the attacks on Israelis by Arabs,⁶⁸ making the Israeli-Palestinian tensions even worse. In the future, ISIS media campaign is likely to spillover the scope of terrorism and become an important factor in the global turmoil.

III. Media Anti-Terror: A Significant Flank of the International War On Terror

With help of opportunity of the new media technology revolution, Daesh attaches great importance to media propaganda strategy, realizes a good combination between the "Offline" military conquest and "Online" extensive propaganda, resulting in a wide-range, complex and shocking horror effect. The international community as well as governments, media agencies and media corporations of many countries are at alert to high degree and respond in various ways.

First, the international media's struggles against terrorism have achieved initial success

First of all, through imposing pressure and adopting rules and regulations, etc., governments and their security departments begin strictly monitoring all international cyber networks and media companies. In June 2015, John Karin, chief assistant lawyer in charge of national security affairs stated that the threat of violence is increasing, which needs redoubled efforts to respond."⁶⁹ Some European governments explicitly demand social media companies to

clear the contents of terrorism. In early June 2015, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee passed a Bill requiring social media companies to notify the government when they detect a suspicious content. The United Nations also requires governments to strengthen supervision over mass media companies.⁷⁰ In June 2014, the Iraqi Government continuously blocked the social media platforms for 17 days in order to interrupt the communication between ISIS members, also closed 20 news websites including the Arabia media.⁷¹

Secondly, ISIS has also forced governments and social media companies to carry out cooperation. Under the support of the U.S. Government, the Google Corporation launched the Anti-violent extremism network and gave those extremists the opportunity to turn over a new life.⁷² FaceBook is in a very harsh way to clear the contents, and gives support to the government initiatives. Company CEO M. Bickett states that we give Zero Tolerance policy for any act or statement praising or supporting a terrorist organization.⁷³ Twitter also announces a ban on promotion of terrorism. From September to December 2014, Twitter closed more than 1000 accounts in support of ISIS,⁷⁴ a powerful blow indeed to ISIS's propaganda capacity on Twitter. In addition, a number of Twitter users have created #ISISMediaBlackout, calling on people to stop forwarding ISIS video links.⁷⁵ In recent years, a number of specialized information processing companies such as BEAsystem and MTNgovernment are established, specializing in screening, monitoring and deleting information of the various social media.⁷⁶

Thirdly, exposing ISIS falsehood and evil through social media projects with specific cases. For example, the relevant government departments and social media companies cooperate to extensively promote the real experience of those who escape from ISIS, and effectively spiked some people's fantasy on ISIS. In September 2015, CSCC of the U.S. State Department has launched a social media program entitled #Why They Left Daesh to record the story of Hadige, a London girl student. She said in an interview that the Islamic state continues to kill Muslims and cheat us. CSCC produced 36 social tags through the project, and played 13 videos in a week, receiving about 80 million viewers.⁷⁷ CSCC also starts a "Think again and

Leave" project to convince people to stay away from ISIS. One named @ umm-Muthanna on Twitter praises the terrorist Anwar Aulaki, but a CSCC staff scolds him as the just pious love of prostitute.⁷⁸ Exposing ISIS media propaganda can effectively weaken its attractiveness.

Second, the constraints and difficulties of international media struggle against terror

To further promote the international anti-terrorism cooperation in the field of media publicity is also facing many contradictions and challenges.

First of all, the world's media cooperation demand based on anti-terrorism is obviously weak. Brand new terrorist threats make more and more countries realize that the war on terror will be a protracted warfare of ideas. In Early in 2015, British Prime Minister Cameron described the new war on terror as the struggle against extremist ideology.⁷⁹ In July 2015, U.S. President Obama said that we must bravely break terrorist propaganda twisted ideology, because these ideas will incite people to carry out violent terrorist activities.⁸⁰ The United Nations and the United States also appeal to actively adopt non-military means to deal with the rapid spread of the terrorist ideology.

Unfortunately, despite various countries begin monitoring the major social media platforms, but international media cooperation based on anti-terrorism is far from being implemented. Even among media in close collaboration between the allied countries, there is a clear contradiction between their news production "frameworks". For example, the United States and Pakistan are important anti-terror partners, but report on the UAV bombing in Pakistan, the U.S. Washington Post avoided the heavy casualties while the Pakistani "News" stressed the consequences of the bombing, thus shaping a very sharp "framework conflict" between the two sides.⁸¹ Currently, the parties (such as the United States, Russia and France, etc.) to combat ISIS have different positions on the Government of Syria, also contradictions in other geopolitical interests, and mutual strategic trust is weak, so the news media agencies are difficult to reach a unified, coherent and powerful discourse and narrative. For a long time, the Western media are used to the narrative -- "Islamic phobia",⁸² not only indirectly enhancing the ISIS publicity credibility, but also

hindering counterterrorism information sharing and media cooperation between Western countries and Arab countries in the world.

Secondly, media lack of resources on anti-terrorist publicity. At present, countries in the world seriously neglect investment for the media strategic resources regarding anti-terrorism resources configuration. In FY 2015, the U.S. spending on homeland defense and security reached \$70.9 billion, about \$36 billion went to the Department of Homeland Security. CSIS Cordesman argues that huge military spending is really helping to combat extremism, but our public relations is bearhanded.⁸³ Because of lack of financial and technical support, Western countries such as the United States, etc., lag behind, are slow and ineffective in countering ISIS media propaganda. FBI Director James Komi in June 2015 helplessly said that FBI cannot effectively prevent ISIS from recruiting through social media, and the current technology is not good enough to accurately monitor those American citizen who intend to join ISIS.⁸⁴

For the phenomenon of teenagers to join ISIS through social media, the United States, the United Kingdom have begun the comprehensive community intervention. In early 2015, head of the Denver branch, FBI, successfully blocked a 19 year-old girl Sharon Kangly's plan from joining ISIS. In January 2014, the Minneapolis government also successfully blocked a 18 year-old Mohamed Yousaf from joining ISIS.⁸⁵ The United Kingdom in 2007 started a preventive project, and planned to prevent the spread of the trend of cyber extremism in the primary and secondary schools and universities.⁸⁶ Comparatively, European countries have a higher degree of specialized intervention measures, they have a clear task to define, evaluation standard and the division of responsibilities and rights while police, teachers, doctors and communal staff have professional training. But in general, intervention effect is still relatively fragmented.

Thirdly, it is difficult for various countries media regulators to achieve a balance between freedom of speech and the professional ethics of journalism. The American Society of Professional Journalists has a clear rule on how to minimize the risk of news coverage and bans journalists on catering to the audience's curiosity and wanton incitement. As video images of ISIS various atrocities are flooding out, the "Washington Post",

"New York Times" and Persian Gulf TV stations, etc. face an unprecedented moral test. In this regard, the Middle East Expert C. Cooper calls on major media to follow the professional ethics of journalism in response to ISIS propaganda, although audience needs to learn the ISIS's cruelty, journalism should not become a propaganda tool for ISIS.⁸⁷

The fact is that the performance of major media organizations, newspapers and publications are indeed different.⁸⁸ After ISIS uploaded the video of American journalists James Frey and Stephen Sotloff being slaughtered, the Persian Gulf TV immediately states that it decides not to play any of the killing videos, and hopes other media will do there same. Then, New York Times only carries a brief report with a photo on the front page; Reuters agency played a dialogue between Sotloff and the executer, and disclosed nothing more. However, a Cyber News Corp. in Holland thoroughly plays the video. The Wall Street Journal previously specifies opposition to play these materials, but ultimately uploads the video.

In view of ISIS increasingly arrogant propaganda offensive, the U.S. government attitude in monitoring news reports on terrorist attacks is becoming more and more tough. In September 2015, Hilary Clinton pointed out in a speech in Washington that we're going to push ISIS out of their controlled territory, and will also drive them out the 'virtual territory' even though we hear all kinds of complaints about the freedom of speech.⁸⁹ University of Chicago law professor Eric Posner also stressed that ISIS makes us have to restrict freedom of speech. In this regard, Aileen Sotman, a British scholar, argues that these video images can be deleted by some publications and media, but can be found somewhere else easily, besides, public has the right to know these.⁹⁰ Now, governments have not yet adopted clear and transparent rules for the operation of social media companies, making violent terror censorship and deletion work difficult. A report released by the Wilson Center in September 2014 showed that of the YouTube uploading 125 ISIS videos, four month latter there are still 57 in existence; and the convenience, flexibility and reproducibility of Twitter and FaceBook make it more likely to become the tools of ISIS. After a severe blow and blockade on June 12, 2014 in Iraq, FaceBook

users and access dropped 70%, but the registration of Whisper applications in the three days doubled.⁹¹ These regulatory actions on cyber media also incurred the public discontent. In 2011, Turkey set up the Internet Commission, all cyber service providers must strictly comply with the relevant regulations, and rent the websites from the Commission. This is Turkey's severe move in the field of private information, but resulted in a public demonstration held by a large number of Turkey's people against the move.⁹²

Finally, media legislation should be improved in the world. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Bali Island terrorist attacks in 2002, the Australian government in 2004 and 2005 adopted anti-terrorist media legislation, strictly regulating the terrorism-related publications. In 2011, the Federal Court decided in accordance with the relevant amendments that columnist Boulter Andrew for the Herald Sun in Melbourne was in violation of the law, and told the newspaper to publicly clarify its improper reporting.⁹³ In 2007, Turkey adopted the Internet Bill, which provides that Turkey Telecom and IT Top Commission has the right to shut down any pornographic, drug, terrorist and child-abuse websites. Some cyber platforms such as YouTube, Twitter and Kurdish newspapers "Firat News" are shut down.⁹⁴

However, currently, the progress of media legislation in various countries is still inefficient and ineffective. Since 2004, two priests deliberately misinterpreting the "Koran" cases are final settled in Australia, whose media legislation has led to the extreme dissatisfaction of its people, and which is criticized as a police state for controlling the freedom of the press.⁹⁵ And Turkey is kind of on and off in cyber space control, which is a corporation interest-related issue in Turkey so it is difficult to handle.⁹⁶ In the United States, a clear-cut cyber media legislation is not yet in place.⁹⁷ In Russia, the Russian Duma proposed to amend the Article Four of the Mass Media Law 1991 in failure in response to the TV showing the victims' bodies after the terrorist attacks on the theatre in Moscow on October 23, 2002.⁹⁸

IV. Conclusion

To sum up, the reason that Daesh media propaganda has achieved great success is that it is resulted from the achievements of new media technology innovation, and it's highlighting the propaganda strategy and effective implementation. Unfortunately, the will in the world to cooperate in media anti-terrorism is rather weak and counterattack is insufficient. The author argues that to reverse this passive situation, the following aspects can be explored.

First, various countries need to enhance the media status of counter-terrorism cooperation in the strategic framework. To Strengthen the media counterterrorism cooperation, there is a need to vigorously enhance the countermeasure capacity of various actors such as governments, security agencies and mainstream media, etc. but also a need to promote media cooperation between the anti-terrorism allies, especially cooperation with majority of Arabic media.

Second, to achieve a bold breakthrough in the specific means of media anti-terrorism. In the past, the cyber and media extremism are dealt with by promoting information of justice or directly removing from the media platform the extreme information. However, to rapidly pool and mobilize anti-terrorism social forces through social media is a powerful barrier to prevent the spread of extreme collective identity. In addition, through the society, school and community cooperation, to enhance the effectiveness of preventive propaganda and intervention is also the new direction to explore how to prevent adolescent extremism.

Finally, various countries should introduce more transparent and strict media ethics standards and laws and regulations. Especially control of the traditional mainstream media should be strengthened with "objective" and "accurate" journalism professional standards. At the same time, the relevant legislation related to media information and intelligence exchange should be further advanced. China on December 27, 2015, adopted Counterterrorism Law of the People's Republic of China, whose Article Fourth provides a strong legal basis for cracking down on extremist propaganda.

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