The Iraq War and Non-proliferation
By Chen Huaifan, Research Fellow, CPAPD

The Iraq war has resulted in the allied forces occupying Iraq and no one knowing the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and the alleged weapons of mass destruction(WMD). Having gone through the nightmares of fire and blood, people have started to review the most controversial war in history. What objectives has the war achieved? Does Iraq really have weapons of mass destruction? What implications will this war have on non-proliferation issues?


WMD: a pretext of going to war


The issue of WMD of Iraq has been used as a good justification by the allied forces for going to war in this country. While the war was under preparation, officials of the U.S. and UK put much emphasis on the point that Saddam had already possessed or were acquiring WMD and might use them in a brutal way, or even transfer them to terrorist groups. Last autumn in an interview, Condoleezza Rice, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, mentioned the reasons why planning to attack Iraq, she said arms control methods carried out since 1991 had not prevented Iraq from pursuing or possessing WMD. On January 28, in his State of the Union Address, President Bush also said that nothing could prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring WMD. He stressed:


Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He¡¯s not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them. The U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them despite Iraq¡¯s recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.


He also said, the British government had learned that ¡°Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.¡± ¡°Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.¡± ¡°The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving.¡±


On March 30, while the war was entering the first week, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said they knew the whereabouts of WMD in Iraq. They were around Tikrit or Bagdad, somewhere to the east and west, north and south. Two months later, he changed his mind by saying that he did not know the answer to the question. He said it was possible that Iraqi leaders had decided to destroy them (WMD) prior to the conflict. In the UK, before the war, Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made it quite clear that the UK was entering the war to disarm Saddam, to eradicate the threat of WMD, not for regime change. Blair even once said the Iraqis might use nuclear weapons in 45 minutes. In spite of large scale anti-war movements throughout the world including the strongest anti-war voices from the U.S. and the UK, the fear of WMD advocated by the two governments had indeed gained the understanding and support of the people of the two countries.


Justifying the war after the end of the war.


The fact that no WMD have been discovered so far has aroused more doubts about the motivation of the U.S. waging the war. Does Iraq really have WMD? In fact, even the U.S. itself was not confident enough upon the reasons for launching the war. Before the war, the threat of WMD was much emphasized; while during the war, the purpose of the war had become either eliminating WMD of Iraq or realizing regime change. On the second day of the war, Rumsfeld said, the first purpose of the war was to remove the Saddam administration, the second was to disarm its WMD. When the war came to its 10th day, according to spokesman of the Pentagon, discovering WMD had become the fourth objective and the fifth was destroying them. Throughout the war and particularly after the war, great efforts were made by the allied forces of the U.S. and the UK to search for these weapons, but unfortunately, the WMD were nowhere just like Saddam Hussein. Since the end of May, Tony Blair has been challenged by those anti-war personages who accused him of having intentionally exaggerated the WMD threat by Iraq. The U.S. media also reported intensively about the possibility of the government exaggerating or even lying on the issue of Iraqi WMD. Meanwhile, leaders of other U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia were also faced with pressure from the public and media, who demanded an explanation for the reasons to support the war in Iraq. At that moment, the answers from officials of the U.S. government were ambiguous or even self-contradicting. Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Defence Secretary, leaked some of the real U.S. intentions. He said, the Bush administration only focused on the alleged WMD because it was a politically convenient means of justifying the removal of Saddam. ¡°For bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on.¡± However, President Bush soon asserted that they had already found evidence of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction. He meant the two trailers which had been found and believed to be used as mobile labs.


On July 7, the White House conceded that Bush¡¯s allegation about Iraq having tried to buy uranium from Niger in an effort to start building nuclear weapons was based on faulty intelligence. Meanwhile, a British parliamentary commission report also challenged Blair¡¯s allegation that Iraq had sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa for a possible nuclear weapons program.

A pre-emptive war for counter-proliferation?


If the war was to disarm Iraq of its WMD as put forward by the U.S. and the UK, then the war can be called a preemptive war for the purpose of counterproliferation. Now the question is under what circumstances preemptive attack can be launched against a country? We may find the answer by reading through the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction published last December. In terms of counterproliferation, the report said, ¡°Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary¡¯s WMD assets before these weapons are used.¡± This document makes it quite clear that preemptive attack can be launched when an enemy is armed with WMD.


The case of Iraq does not seem to fall into this category. As far as we can know from the current findings, there is so far no convincing evidence to show that Iraq has already had WMD or even has any such significant programs before the war. What Iraq did during the early1990s can not be used as evidence in the early 21st century. In addition, even if Iraq had WMD, would it ever have the gut to threaten the use of them against the U.S.? Or when did the U.S. really feel the serious threat from Iraq¡¯s weapons of mass destruction? When a regime came to the moment of survival, it did not use its last resources, then what did it acquire this weapons for? Therefore, if the purpose of the war is to solve the problem of proliferation of WMD in Iraq, then the Iraq war has not played the role of counterproliferation, because no WMD has ever been discovered so far.


If not for counterproliferation, then for what?


If the war on Iraq was not for counterproliferation purpose, but for other ones like what the people had suggested that the U.S. was intending to dominate the Middle East, for oil or for whatsoever, then the world is faced with an even more serious issue. The proliferation issue has become the concern of the whole world, because it is related to the security of each country. International efforts have been made to solve this issue and a non-proliferation regime has been established. In recent years, this regime has been challenged one way or the other, and is becoming fragile. Greater international efforts are needed to mend and consolidate the non-proliferation regime. When non-proliferation issue is used as a tool or excuse (especially when being based on faulty intelligence) for military action, it will greatly damage the authority, credibility and effectiveness of this mechanism. Lack of trust, confidence and cooperation among countries as a result of such kind of military actions will further shake the regime.


We have reasons to worry about the future authority of the international verification system of the non-proliferation regime as well. Just before the war, on March 7, 2003, Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed Baradei, updated the Security Council on the status of the IAEA¡¯s nuclear verification activities in Iraq. The conclusion was that ¡°After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.¡± The same day, UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix also made a report about the inspections in Iraq, saying ¡°No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found.¡± ¡°No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.¡± Despite these statements made by the IAEA and UNMOVIC, the U.S. just could not wait to go to war to search for evidence by its own forces. People get confused about who on earth has the final say about the inspection results.


We also have good reasons to worry about the further possible proliferation of WMD after the war, at least in a long run. The war might further complicate the process of dealing with the current proliferation hot spots. For those countries who have the intention or programs to pursue WMD, the lessons they draw from the Iraq war might be like this: you may not be rewarded by observing the non-proliferation regime and being cooperative with the verification process. The only way for self-defense is to become nuclear states.

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