| By Chen Huaifan, Research Fellow, CPAPD
The Iraq war has resulted in the allied forces
occupying Iraq and no one knowing the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein
and the alleged weapons of mass destruction(WMD). Having gone through
the nightmares of fire and blood, people have started to review
the most controversial war in history. What objectives has the war
achieved? Does Iraq really have weapons of mass destruction? What
implications will this war have on non-proliferation issues?
WMD: a pretext of going to war
The issue of WMD of Iraq has been used as a good justification by
the allied forces for going to war in this country. While the war
was under preparation, officials of the U.S. and UK put much emphasis
on the point that Saddam had already possessed or were acquiring
WMD and might use them in a brutal way, or even transfer them to
terrorist groups. Last autumn in an interview, Condoleezza Rice,
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, mentioned
the reasons why planning to attack Iraq, she said arms control methods
carried out since 1991 had not prevented Iraq from pursuing or possessing
WMD. On January 28, in his State of the Union Address, President
Bush also said that nothing could prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring
WMD. He stressed:
Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the
materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX
nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also
kill untold thousands. He¡¯s not accounted for these materials. He
has given no evidence that he has destroyed them. The U.S. intelligence
indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable
of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16
of them despite Iraq¡¯s recent declaration denying their existence.
Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these
prohibited munitions. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed
them.
He also said, the British government had learned that ¡°Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.¡±
¡°Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase
high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.¡±
¡°The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary, he is deceiving.¡±
On March 30, while the war was entering the first week, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld said they knew the whereabouts of WMD in Iraq.
They were around Tikrit or Bagdad, somewhere to the east and west,
north and south. Two months later, he changed his mind by saying
that he did not know the answer to the question. He said it was
possible that Iraqi leaders had decided to destroy them (WMD) prior
to the conflict. In the UK, before the war, Prime Minister Tony
Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made it quite clear that
the UK was entering the war to disarm Saddam, to eradicate the threat
of WMD, not for regime change. Blair even once said the Iraqis might
use nuclear weapons in 45 minutes. In spite of large scale anti-war
movements throughout the world including the strongest anti-war
voices from the U.S. and the UK, the fear of WMD advocated by the
two governments had indeed gained the understanding and support
of the people of the two countries.
Justifying the war after the end of the war.
The fact that no WMD have been discovered so far has aroused
more doubts about the motivation of the U.S. waging the war. Does
Iraq really have WMD? In fact, even the U.S. itself was not confident
enough upon the reasons for launching the war. Before the war, the
threat of WMD was much emphasized; while during the war, the purpose
of the war had become either eliminating WMD of Iraq or realizing
regime change. On the second day of the war, Rumsfeld said, the
first purpose of the war was to remove the Saddam administration,
the second was to disarm its WMD. When the war came to its 10th
day, according to spokesman of the Pentagon, discovering WMD had
become the fourth objective and the fifth was destroying them. Throughout
the war and particularly after the war, great efforts were made
by the allied forces of the U.S. and the UK to search for these
weapons, but unfortunately, the WMD were nowhere just like Saddam
Hussein. Since the end of May, Tony Blair has been challenged by
those anti-war personages who accused him of having intentionally
exaggerated the WMD threat by Iraq. The U.S. media also reported
intensively about the possibility of the government exaggerating
or even lying on the issue of Iraqi WMD. Meanwhile, leaders of other
U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia were also faced
with pressure from the public and media, who demanded an explanation
for the reasons to support the war in Iraq. At that moment, the
answers from officials of the U.S. government were ambiguous or
even self-contradicting. Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Defence Secretary,
leaked some of the real U.S. intentions. He said, the Bush administration
only focused on the alleged WMD because it was a politically convenient
means of justifying the removal of Saddam. ¡°For bureaucratic reasons
we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction, because it
was the one reason everyone could agree on.¡± However, President
Bush soon asserted that they had already found evidence of Iraq
having weapons of mass destruction. He meant the two trailers which
had been found and believed to be used as mobile labs.
On July 7, the White House conceded that Bush¡¯s allegation about
Iraq having tried to buy uranium from Niger in an effort to start
building nuclear weapons was based on faulty intelligence. Meanwhile,
a British parliamentary commission report also challenged Blair¡¯s
allegation that Iraq had sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa for a possible nuclear weapons program.
A pre-emptive war for counter-proliferation?
If the war was to disarm Iraq of its WMD as put forward by
the U.S. and the UK, then the war can be called a preemptive war
for the purpose of counterproliferation. Now the question is under
what circumstances preemptive attack can be launched against a country?
We may find the answer by reading through the U.S. National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction published last December. In
terms of counterproliferation, the report said, ¡°Because deterrence
may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences
of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military
forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability
to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate
cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to
detect and destroy an adversary¡¯s WMD assets before these weapons
are used.¡± This document makes it quite clear that preemptive attack
can be launched when an enemy is armed with WMD.
The case of Iraq does not seem to fall into this category. As far
as we can know from the current findings, there is so far no convincing
evidence to show that Iraq has already had WMD or even has any such
significant programs before the war. What Iraq did during the early1990s
can not be used as evidence in the early 21st century. In addition,
even if Iraq had WMD, would it ever have the gut to threaten the
use of them against the U.S.? Or when did the U.S. really feel the
serious threat from Iraq¡¯s weapons of mass destruction? When a regime
came to the moment of survival, it did not use its last resources,
then what did it acquire this weapons for? Therefore, if the purpose
of the war is to solve the problem of proliferation of WMD in Iraq,
then the Iraq war has not played the role of counterproliferation,
because no WMD has ever been discovered so far.
If not for counterproliferation, then for what?
If the war on Iraq was not for counterproliferation purpose,
but for other ones like what the people had suggested that the U.S.
was intending to dominate the Middle East, for oil or for whatsoever,
then the world is faced with an even more serious issue. The proliferation
issue has become the concern of the whole world, because it is related
to the security of each country. International efforts have been
made to solve this issue and a non-proliferation regime has been
established. In recent years, this regime has been challenged one
way or the other, and is becoming fragile. Greater international
efforts are needed to mend and consolidate the non-proliferation
regime. When non-proliferation issue is used as a tool or excuse
(especially when being based on faulty intelligence) for military
action, it will greatly damage the authority, credibility and effectiveness
of this mechanism. Lack of trust, confidence and cooperation among
countries as a result of such kind of military actions will further
shake the regime.
We have reasons to worry about the future authority of the international
verification system of the non-proliferation regime as well. Just
before the war, on March 7, 2003, Director General of the IAEA,
Mohamed Baradei, updated the Security Council on the status of the
IAEA¡¯s nuclear verification activities in Iraq. The conclusion was
that ¡°After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date
found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear
weapons programme in Iraq.¡± The same day, UNMOVIC Executive Chairman
Hans Blix also made a report about the inspections in Iraq, saying
¡°No evidence of proscribed activities has so far been found.¡± ¡°No
underground facilities for chemical or biological production or
storage were found so far.¡± Despite these statements made by the
IAEA and UNMOVIC, the U.S. just could not wait to go to war to search
for evidence by its own forces. People get confused about who on
earth has the final say about the inspection results.
We also have good reasons to worry about the further possible proliferation
of WMD after the war, at least in a long run. The war might further
complicate the process of dealing with the current proliferation
hot spots. For those countries who have the intention or programs
to pursue WMD, the lessons they draw from the Iraq war might be
like this: you may not be rewarded by observing the non-proliferation
regime and being cooperative with the verification process. The
only way for self-defense is to become nuclear states.
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