Strengthening the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Sun Xiangli

After the end of the Cold War, although the hazard of direct nuclear conflicts between two antagonistic military blocs has been mitigated, nuclear weapon related dangers still exist. Thousands of nuclear weapons with hair-trigger alert are still deployed in nuclear superpowers, the number of countries with nuclear weapons is increasing, the stockpile of nuclear weapon usable materials is expanding, the threat of nuclear terrorism is approaching to us… Never before have these problems so complicatedly interconnected with one another as they are today. If the international community does not properly solve these problems, the prospect of the world is quite grim. In order to defuse the threats of nuclear weapons, efforts in the following aspects should be made: reducing dramatically the nuclear stockpiles of major nuclear powers, strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and establishing effective security system on nuclear materials. Here, the author would focus on the issue of how to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
As we’re all aware, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the non-proliferation treaty as its core, is a nuclear proliferation prevention regime based on assurance for peaceful use of nuclear energy and promotion for further nuclear disarmament. It is an institutional arrangement for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states making compromise. It stands on three pillars: non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. If such a regime failed, the security and sustainable development of the world would be at stake and the nuclear weapon related dangers would increase or even run out of control. Unfortunately, the NPT Review Conference held in New York in May 2005 tuned out to be fruitless. Fierce arguments broke out among the NPT state parties over issues like security assurance, withdrawal from the NPT, nuclear disarmament, supply of nuclear fuels, regional nuclear problems etc. The failure of the conference has indicated that there are still grave conflicts of interests and divided policies among the major state parties to the NPT. It is safe to say that the NPT regime has been bogged down in a dilemma.
To save the NTP regime, it is necessary to find out the reasons behind its crisis so as to improve it as soon as possible. The author thinks that among so many reasons underlying the predicament, the most fundamental is the lack of a sound security arrangement for non-nuclear-weapon state parties within the regime. Nuclear weapons still enjoy an irreplaceable role in the security field: its function of deterrence can provide great protection for a country’s vital interests. When facing serious military threat but short of other alternative options, a state may turn to developing nuclear weapons. Security concern is the biggest motivation behind their aspirations to possess nuclear weapons. However, to our regret, the NPT regime still lacks a powerful security assurance system thus making it impossible to remove some countries’ motivations for developing nuclear weapons. Therefore, seeking nuclear weapons has become the option of some non-nuclear-weapon states that have security concerns.
The current security arrangement of the NPT regime has two main defects.
First, the security assurance mechanism of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is not legally binding. When the NPT negotiations were initially carried out, it was during a period of fierce nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States. As the danger of a nuclear war and using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state were so real at that time, the original intention of most non-nuclear-weapon states that had actively participated in the negotiations was to oblige all state parties to the treaty to exercise restraint and minimize the hazard of nuclear proliferation. Through their commitment to abandoning their option of developing nuclear weapons, these countries aspired to establishing a treaty mechanism so as to realize common security. Therefore, they demanded to include in the treaty the provision of no threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. But due to the reluctance the America to have its nuclear weapons restricted and the difficulty of coordinating the positions of major nuclear-weapon states, such a request was turned down at last. What they got in the treaty was merely a commitment to promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy. In terms of security assurance, there was only a statement approved by the UN Security Council, declaring “that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.” This is a weak guarantee, so the non-nuclear-weapon states are not satisfied. Obviously, the non-nuclear-weapon states have made concessions in this regard since they were so anxious to reach an agreement on the treaty so as to arrest the trend of nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament.
After the treaty was agreed, non-nuclear-weapon states still kept demanding nuclear-weapon states to make security assurances of not to use nuclear weapons against them. Under the repeated requests of the vast number of non-nuclear-weapon states for years, major nuclear-weapon states issued a statement of not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states at the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations in 1978. In order to perpetuate the validity of the treaty, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, the Security Council approved resolution No. 984, stating that when a non-nuclear-weapon state is under nuclear attack or threat, the Security Council will take immediate actions and provide necessary assistance to it in accordance with the UN Charter. This statement is called Positive Security Assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon states. Then, five nuclear-weapon states also respectively issued their own statements, committing to non-threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. This is called Negative Security Assurances. However, except China, the United States and other nuclear states all attached a reservation clause to their commitments. As these commitments are not official treaties, they are not legally binding. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, non-nuclear-weapon states once again tried to obtain legally binding security assurances. But unfortunately, their efforts failed again.
Second, the nuclear non-proliferation regime runs short of conventional security assurance. Even legally binding positive and negative security assurances had existed, only part of security concern of non-nuclear-weapon states is addressed. For some states, the most evident threat posed by a powerful hostile state is not nuclear strike but conventional attack and military interference. Especially in the post-Cold War period, certain military big powers become more and more bent on unilateralism. Military attacks and interventions are increasingly resorted to. Except the allies of those nuclear big powers, who can enjoy their protection umbrella, most of the other non-nuclear-weapon states do not have conventional security assurances at all. It is just such a hostile international political situation that has stimulated more and more states to acquire nuclear weapons.
In a word, non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT abandoned their nuclear choice that can protect their national security, but the non-proliferation regime in return does not offer them an alternative option to address their security concerns. Therefore current non-proliferation regime is an internally flawed regime.
Fundamentally, proliferation is a political problem rather than a technical one. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, it is necessary to try to remove the impetus of non-nuclear-weapon states to go nuclear. This is the most important step in the efforts to repair the NPT regime. Imperative measure is to offer non-nuclear-weapon states legally binding positive and negative security assurances. At the same time, proliferation prevention efforts should be integrated into global and regional security cooperation mechanism. The international community should join hands to uphold peaceful settlement of international disputes and oppose military interventionism. Only after an effective international and regional security mechanism is established in the international community can it become possible to remove the dependency of every country on nuclear weapons.
Of course, it’s also necessary to further strengthen the current IAEA safeguards system and export control which provide with technical barriers against proliferation. Through the signing of the Additional Protocol, IAEA can oversee the civilian nuclear energy program of the state parties with greater effectiveness and confidence. This is a quite necessary and feasible measure for the improvement of the IAEA, but requesting concerted cooperation and consultation of all countries. Besides, major nuclear powers should take concrete actions in terms of nuclear disarmament by accelerating their pace of eliminating their huge nuclear stockpile. They should also stop to pursue new missions for their nuclear weapons. Otherwise, they would lose their legitimacy within the NPT regime and totally destroy the norm basis underlying the global non-proliferation efforts.
60 years ago, human being for the first time suffered from the enormous disaster of atomic weapons. For the purpose of avoiding another disaster caused by nuclear weapons, we must manage to walk out of the dilemma of the NPT regime with an effort to sustain and improve it. Such a challenge is too formidable to be tackled by only one or two states. Global action and a multilateral agenda are therefore needed